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Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation v.
Canada (NAFTA Chapter 11)
Part II: Are Fears Founded?
Timothy Ross Wilson*
"I know you're out there.
I can feel you now.
I know that you're afraid.
You're afraid of us.
You're afraid of change.
I don't know the future.
I didn't come here to tell you how this is going to end.
I came here to tell you how it's going to begin.
I'm going to hang up this phone and then I'm going to show these people what you
don't want them to see.
I'm going to show them a world without you, a world without rules and controls,
without borders or boundaries, a world where anything is possible.
Where we go from there is a choice I leave to you."'
I. Introduction to Part II.
In Part 1,2 the claim by Ethyl Corporation under chapter 11 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was examined. In Part II, my purpose is to focus on
NAFTA article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation). I will discuss some of the broader
* Member of the Ontario Bar. Adjunct Professor in International Trade Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Ottawa. Legal Counsel, Law Branch, Supreme Court of Canada. The opinions
expressed herein are my own, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada.
1. THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers 1999).
2. See Timothy Ross Wilson, Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter I )-Part
I: Claim and Award on Jurisdiction, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 52 (2000).
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policy considerations surrounding investment;3 in particular, the extent to which domestic
legislation may be constrained by NAFTA. Finally, I will speculate as to whether or not there
is a sovereignty-restoring solution short of withdrawal from the agreement.
In order to better understand article 1110, 1 propose, first of all, to view it in context.
NAFTA creates a free trade area under article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). 4 Because NAFTA parties were already bound by various bilateral
agreements, article 103(2) provides that NAFTA prevails over these agreements. In partic-
ular, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement provides for a more limited set of investment
rights and obligations than does NAFTA. Certain specified multilateral and bilateral envi-
ronmental and conservation agreements, however, are given primacy over NAFTA by arti-
3. See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Opening Doors to the
World: Canada's International Market Access Priorities 2000 (Apr. 5, 2000), at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/2000O/3-e.asp:
3. Investment
Foreign investment flows worldwide have grown rapidly in recent years and have
figured prominently in the trend toward global economic integration. The global
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased more than six-fold over the
past two decades, from US$524 billion in 1980 to US$3.5 trillion in 1997.
Canada is an active player in this global economy. Canadian direct investment
abroad (CDIA) has more than tripled from $74 billion in 1987 to $240 billion in
1998. Over the same period, foreign direct investment in Canada has doubled,
from $106 billion in 1987 to $217 billion. Since 1996, the stock of CDIA has sur-
passed the stock of FDI in Canada.
Canadian Direct Investment Abroad
... In 1998, 53 percent ($126 billion) of CDIA was located in the United States. A
further 19 percent of CDIA ($46 billion) was based in the European Union.
Other major Canadian investment locations include Barbados ($14.3 billion),
Bahamas ($6.1 billion), Bermuda ($4.7 billion), Chile ($4.2 billion), Japan ($3.2
billion) and Hong Kong ($2.9 billion). Similar to global trends, developing coun-
tries are becoming increasingly important destinations for CDIA. In 1988, 14
percent of Canada's outward investment went to developing countries. By 1998,
that percentage had increased to approximately 24 percent ($58 billion) ...
Foreign Direct Investment in Canada
... In 1998, the United States accounted for $147 billion or 68 percent of FDI in
Canada (down from a high of 75 percent in 1985). The European Union repre-
sented $45 billion or 19 percent of FDI in Canada. Other significant investors
included Japan ($8.1 billion), Hong Kong ($3.4 billion), Caribbean countries
($2.8 billion) and Bermuda ($1.7 billion). FDI in Canada was well-diversified
across industrial sectors. Major recipient sectors included finance (19 percent),
energy and metals (18 percent), machinery and transportation equipment (14
percent), services and retailing (10 percent) and wood and paper (8 percent). The
remaining 31 percent was widely diversified across other sectors.
Id.
4. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 101, 31 I.L.M.
605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTAI.
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cle 104 and Annex 104.1. 5 In addition, tax conventions prevail over NAFTA.6 In the case
of inconsistency within NAFTA itself, other chapters prevail over chapter 11 (investment)
to the extent of the inconsistency.
7
NAFTA provides for exceptions and reservations to some of its obligations. Most excep-
tions are set out in chapter 21. The general exceptions contained in GATT, article XX, 8 are
5. Namely, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, The Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, and The Agreement Between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 104(1) and
Annex 104. Amendments to these agreeinents as well as further similar agreements may be
added by agreement of the parties. See id. art. 104(2).
6. See id. art. 2103(2) (subject to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5)).
7. See id. art. 1112.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Oct. 30,
1947, art. XX, (hereinafter GATT]:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under
paragraph 4 of article II and article XVII, the protection of patents, trade
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such mea-
sures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental com-
modity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which is itself so
submitted and not so disapproved; [note: The exception provided for in this
sub-paragraph extends to any commodity agreement which conforms to the
principles approved by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 30
(IV) of 28 March 1947].
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure
essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry dur-
ing periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the
world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such
restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection
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incorporated by reference; they apply to selected areas of NAFTA9 (excluding investment).
Other exceptions cover national security,10 taxation,'1 balance of payments, 12 disclosure of
information, 13 and cultural industries. 14 Only article 2103(6) expressly concerns investment.
It provides that if an investor feels that a taxation measure is expropriatory, the investor must
first refer the taxation measure to the defined taxation authorities. If they are of the opinion
that the impugned measure is not expropriatory, the investor may not submit that claim
under chapter 11.15
NAFTA reservations are found in Annexes I to VII. With respect to investment, arti-
cle 1108 provides that articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1103 (Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) Treatment), 1106 (Performance Requirements), and 1107 (Senior Management
and Boards of Directors) do not apply to existing non-conforming measures (Annex I) or
to sectors (Annex II).16
afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions
of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination;
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local
short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the
principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the
international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which
are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discon-
tinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-paragraph
not later than 30 June 1960.
Id.
9. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2101.
10. See id. art. 2102; see also id. art. 1138.
11. See id. arts. 2103 and 2107.
12. See id. art. 2104.
13. See id. art. 2105.
14. See id. arts. 2106, 2107 and Annex 2106.
15. See id. art. 2103(6):
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) shall apply to taxation measures
except that no investor may invoke that article as the basis for a claim under arti-
cle 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on its Own Behalf) or 1117 (Claim by
an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an Enterprise), where it has been determined
pursuant to this paragraph that the measure is not an expropriation. The investor
shall refer the issue of whether the measure is not an expropriation for a determi-
nation to the appropriate competent authorities set out in Annex 2103.6 at the
time that it gives notice under article 1119 (Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration). If the competent authorities do not agree to consider the issue or,
having agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the measure is not an expropriation
within a period of six months of such referral, the investor may submit its claim
to arbitration under article 1120 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration).
Id.
16. See id. art. 1108.
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Interestingly, 17 in Canada's Annex II reservation covering the social services sector,
only two investment obligations are mentioned (articles 1102 and 1107).18 Consequently,
the obligations of articles 1103 and 1106 apply, as do those obligations to which no reser-
vation may be taken under article 1108, namely, article 1105 (Minimum Standard of
Treatment) and article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation). Finally, no reservation
was available against section B of chapter 11, the investor-state dispute settlement mecha-
nism. Thus, claims could be brought against various investment-infringing measures and
an arbitral tribunal seized of the claim would be forced to interpret the effect of the rele-
vant reservations. The Free Trade Commission 19 may make binding interpretations of
reservations at the request of one of the disputing parties. 20 The Commission may also
issue a binding interpretation of any provision of NAFTA.2 1
17. One wonders why Canada did not reserve all areas available to it under article 1108, which
provides: "Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107 do not apply to . any existing non-conforming
measure that is maintained by... a Party at the federal level, as set out in its Schedule to Annex
I .. " Id. art. 1108(1). According to the Canadian Statement on Implementation "If]or Canada,
all existing non-conforming federal measures are grandfathered and listed in annex I."
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Department of External Affairs, NAFTA: Canada
Statement on Implementation 150 (Jan. 1, 1994). Presumably, Canadian authorities considered
that Canada's investment measures conformed to NAFTA's MFN and performance require-
ments in the social services area and consequently did not need to be grandfathered. Under
article 1108(2), each Party had two years to list existing non-conforming measures maintained
by a sub-federal unit. Canada availed itself of this provision on March 29, 1996. In letters to
his NAFTA counterparts, the Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister for International Trade,
listed in Annex I the following reservation:
Sector: All Sectors
Type of Reservation: National Treatment (1102, 1202), Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment (1103, 1203), Local Presence (1205), Performance Requirements
(1106), Senior Management and Boards of Directors (1107)
Level of Government: Provincial
Measures: All existing non-conforming measures of all provinces and territories.
Phase-out: None.
Letter from the Honourable Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister for International Trade, to NAFTA
officials (on file with author).
18. All NAFTA parties adopted the same description for the Annex II reservations to the social ser-
vices sector:
[NAFTA Party] reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect
to the provision of public law enforcement and correctional services, and the fol-
lowing services to the extent that they are social services established or main-
tained for a public purpose: income security or insurance, social security or
insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care.
NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex II (language present in all three nation's schedules). Mexico and
the United States reserved articles 1102, 1202, 1205, and 1107. Canada reserved those and arti-
cle 1203 (MFN).
19. See id. art. 2001.
20. See id. art. 1132(1). The only interpretation given to date is as follows: "The listing of a mea-
sure in Annex I is without prejudice to a future claim that Annex II may apply to the measure
or some application of the measure." Report of the NAFTA Working Group On Investment and
Services (Mar. 18, 1997), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/report7-e.asp.
21. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1131(2).
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In addition to exceptions and reservations, there are discrete areas of non-application
("carve-outs"). Chapter 11 does not apply to financial services, 22 Annex III economic
activities (specifically Mexican), 23 and statutory investment reviews by either Canada or
Mexico. 24 Carve-outs from article 1110 are taxation, 25 certain actions related to intellec-
tual property,26 and debt securities and loans. 27
Tribunals constituted under section B of chapter 11 decide claims28 in accordance with
NAFTA and applicable rules of international law.29 They function according to arbitration
systems incorporated into NAFTA by reference.30 Their decisions are subject to review in
the selected territory of arbitration. 31 Final arbitral awards only bind the parties to the arbi-
tration. 32 Publication of awards is governed by Annex 1137.4. 33 It should also be noted that
the dispute settlement mechanism of chapter 11 coexists with that of chapter 20. 3 4
Furthermore, a claimant may seek domestic redress before having recourse to dispute settle-
ment under chapter 11, or even concurrently as long as the domestic proceedings are for
injunctive, declaratory, or other extraordinary relief not involving payment of damages. 35
22. See id. art. 1101(3).
23. See id. art. 1101(2).
24. See id. art. 1138 and Annex 1138.2.
25. See id. art. 2103(6), supra note 15 and accompanying text.
26. See id. art. 1110(7).
27. See id. art. 1110(8).
28. Potential claims could originate from the substantive provisions of chapter 11, section A as
well as article 1502(3)(a) (monopolies) and article 1503(2) (state enterprises). See id. arts.
1101, 1502(3)(a), and 1503(2).
29. See id. art. 1131(1); see also id. arts. 102(2) and 1105(1). For the traditional (U.S.) view of
international expropriation law as opposed to more recent (developing countries') views, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 Reporters' Note 1
(1987): "International arbitral tribunals have consistently applied the traditional rule as set
forth in Subsection (1) [reproduced in note 37] but they have differed in their formulation of
the standard of compensation to be applied."
30. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1120.
31. See id. arts. 1130 and 1136.
32. See id. art. 1136(1).
33. See id. at Annex 1137.4. In the case of Canada, for example, "either Canada or a disputing
investor that is a party to the arbitration may make an award public." Id. at Annex 1137.4
(emphasis added). Under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), Rule 24 provides: "The deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private and
remain secret." ICSID, Additional Facility, Schedule "C" Arbitration, art. 24 (1978), at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/43.htm. The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rule 25.4 provides: "Hearings shall be held in camera
unless the parties agree otherwise." UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 25.4
(1976), at http://www.asser.nl/ica/uctrules.htm, or http://www.uncitral.org/ (emphasis added).
34. See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1115.
35. See id. art. 1121(1)(b). In Azinian et al. v. Mexico, ICSID (Additional Facility), Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mexico-e.pdf, domestic
remedies were exhausted (judgment was obtained from the Federal Circuit Court on May 18,
1995) before the NAFTA chapter 11 claim was initiated. In the Ethyl-MMT affair, an action for
a constitutional declaration was pursued simultaneously with the chapter 11 claim by the
investment (and withdrawn as part of the settlement with Canada). See Ethyl Canada Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney-General), [ 1997] O.J. No. 4225 (Gen. Div.) (QL).
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As previously mentioned, article 1110 is one of the substantive obligations contained
in section A of chapter 11.36 For ease of reference, the substantive obligations cover:
1. National Treatment (article 1102)
2. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment (article 1103) (the better of National
and MFN Treatment - article 1104)
3. Minimum Standard of Treatment (article 1105)
4. Performance Requirements (article 1106)
5. Senior Management and Boards of Directors (article 1107)
6. Transfers (article 1109)
7. Expropriation and Compensation (article 1110)
36. Key chapter 11 concepts defined in article 1139 include: "investor of a Party," "investment,"
"equity or debt securities," and "enterprise." According to article 1139, "investment means:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) an equity security of an enterprise;
(c) a debt security of an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, but
does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state
enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not
include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise;
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of
the enterprise;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that
enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded from sub-
paragraph (c) or (d);
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or
used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes; and
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territo-
ry of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of
the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, rev-
enues or profits of an enterprise;
but investment does not mean,
(i) claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enter-
prise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another
Party, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as
trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or
(j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in
subparagraphs (a) through (h);"
... equity or debt securities includes voting and non-voting shares, bonds, convertible
debentures, stock options and warrants.
NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1139.
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Whereas Annexes I and II reservations are permitted to articles 1102, 1103, 1106, and
1107, under article 1108, none is permitted to the obligations contained in articles 1105,
1109, and 1110. Of these, article 1110 creates the most far-reaching, specific obligations. 37
37. Article 1110 provides:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nation-
alization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropria-
tion"), and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended
expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going
concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and
other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.
4. If payment is made in a G7 currency, compensation shall include interest at a
commercially reasonable rate for that currency from the date of expropriation
until the date of actual payment.
5. If a Party elects to pay in a currency other than a G7 currency, the amount paid
on the date of payment, if converted into a G7 currency at the market rate of
exchange prevailing on that date, shall be no less than if the amount of compen-
sation owed on the date of expropriation had been converted into that G7 curren-
cy at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, and interest had accrued
at a commercially reasonable rate for that G7 currency from the date of expropri-
ation until the date of payment.
6. On payment, compensation shall be freely transferable as provided in Article
1109.
7. This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in rela-
tion to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation
or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property).
8. For purposes of this Article and for greater certainty, a non-discriminatory mea-
sure of general application shall not be considered a measure tantamount to an
expropriation of a debt security or loan covered by this Chapter solely on the
ground that the measure imposes costs on the debtor that cause it to default on
the debt.
Id. art. 1110.
Compare with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 29:
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation.
Spring 2000 213
It prohibits expropriation of an investment unless four conditions are met. To be permis-
sible, an expropriatory measure38 must be: "(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-dis-
criminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and article 1105(1); and (d)
on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.1 99
In theory, the first three conditions are not overly onerous to a NAFTA party. The
fourth condition, payment of compensation, was vividly illustrated by the Ethyl-MMT
affair described in Part I of this article. Aside from the very existence of the investor-state
dispute-settlement mechanism, compensation is probably the most controversial (some
might say shocking) feature of chapter 11. It is partly or mainly responsible for a flurry of
recent commentary that will be examined next.
For compensation to be just under this Subsection, it must, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the prop-
erty taken and be paid at the time of the taking, or within a reasonable time
thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a form economically
usable by the foreign national;
(2) a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a national of another state
(a) where the repudiation or breach is (i) discriminatory; or (ii) motivated by
noncommercial considerations, and compensatory damages are not paid; or
(b) where the foreign national is not given an adequate forum to determine his
claim of repudiation or breach, or is not compensated for any repudiation or
breach determined to have occurred; or
(3) other arbitrary or discriminatory acts or omissions by the state that impair prop-
erty or other economic interests of a national of another state.
Id.
38. "Measure" is defined in article 201: "measure includes any law, regulation, procedure, require-
ment or practice.' NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 201. Article 1101 defines the scope and coverage
of chapter 11:
1. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to:
(a) investors of another Party;
(b) investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party; and
(c) with respect to Article 1106, all investments in the territory of the Party.
2. A Party has the right to perform exclusively the economic activities set out in
Annex III and to refuse to permit the establishment of investment in such
activities.
3. This Chapter does not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party to the
extent that they are covered by Chapter Fourteen (Financial Services).
4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from providing a
service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services,
income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public
education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not incon-
sistent with this Chapter.
Id. art. 1101.
39. Id. art. 1110(1).
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II. Disagreements Over the Implications of Investor-State Claims.
A. AUTHORS CONCERNED ABOUT INVESTOR-STATE CLAIMS.
1. Steven Shrybman.
In a March 13, 2000 legal opinion for the Canadian Union of Public Employees on
Alberta's Bill 11 (Health Care Protection Act),40 Steven Shrybman points out that health
care services in Canada are already being delivered by private for-profit businesses as well
as Canada's traditional public not-for-profit and charitable institutions. 4 1 In examining
Bill 11 in light of Canada's NAFTA obligations, he concludes:
40. Bill 11, Health Care Protection Act, Legis. Assemb. Of Alberta, 4th Sess., 24th Legislature, First
Reading, Mar. 2, 2000, at http://www.assembly.ab.ca/pro/bills/ba-bill.asp?selectbill=Ol 1.
41. Steven Shrybman, A Legal Opinion Concerning NAFTA Investment and Services Disciplines and
Bill 11: Proposals by Alberta to Privatize the Delivery of Certain Insured Health Care Services,
Mar. 13, 2000, at http://www.cupe.ca/shrybman/shrybman.pdf, at 27-28; Mark Kennedy,
Canadians Must 'Draw Line' on Medicare, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 2,2000, at AI:
Newfoundland Premier Brian Tobin says the country must confront some tough
ethical choices about where to 'draw the line' on how generous medicare can be
for Canadians. In a speech yesterday in Toronto to the Canadian Institute of
Actuaries, Mr. Tobin voiced several concerns that other premiers also have raised
in recent weeks. He said Canadians overwhelmingly support the principles of the
30-year-old public health system, but that governments must face the fact that
certain factors-such as the aging population and introduction of expensive tech-
nologies such as MRIs and drug therapies-will dramatically boost fiture costs of
the $60-billion medicare program. He said it's time for some 'frank talk about the
real issues facing our health care system. 'How we deal with emerging technolo-
gies and therapies will have important policy and ethical implications,' Mr.
Tobin's text said, 'For example, should new therapies that benefit a very few be
insured by government, even if they are very costly? Where do we draw the line
between a reasonable standard of service and maintaining a fiscal accountability
over the system?' In his speech, the Liberal premier said the provinces and the
federal government-currently embroiled in a dispute over federal finding for
medicare-must find a way to resolve their differences. He urged the Chretien
government to grant the provinces' 'modest request' of an immediate $4.2 billion
annual boost in health-care transfers. In return, Mr. Tobin said the provinces
should work with the federal government to reform the health system. 'We have
to figure out how to get costs down, while still providing good-quality health care
to Canadians,' said Mr. Tobin. 'We have to recognize that strengthening our
national health-care system is a national project. We should not be afraid to bring
new ideas and approaches to the table for debate. But we can't be running off in
all directions, with each province and the federal government desperately hunting
for magic bullets in isolation of one another. If we do, the system will disinte-
grate.' He stressed that Canadians should avoid the temptation of resorting to
privatized medicine-such as the contentious proposal put forward by Alberta--
to help reduce costs. 'Let's not get duped into thinking that some sort of two-tier
system or system which involves private care institutions will save us.
Id.
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In our view the capacity of the federal government to defend public health
care from the corrosive influence of these international obligations will be
substantially undermined if it does not move quickly to prevent the ever
increasing participation of the private sector in delivering insured health care
services. Should it accept Alberta's plans as being permissible within the feder-
al framework, it will have significantly weakened its ability to protect public
health care from the challenges that all to[o] readily can arise under NAFTA's
enforcement regime. This in turn would have significant repercussions for all
of Canada and undermine the capacity of provincial governments to main-
tain the essentially public, and not-for-profit character of their own health
care systems.4
2
Based on Shrybman's analysis, it appears that NAFTA investors in Canadian for-prof-
it health enterprises already possess certain NAFTA chapter 11 rights. Shrybman points
out that article 1110 is not susceptible to Annex I or Annex II reservations.
4 3
Furthermore, the only exception affecting article 1110 is in the area of taxation.44 Given
an expropriatory action on the part of the central or a provincial government in Canada
affecting a NAFTA investor in a for-profit health enterprise, the investor would currently
have access to section B of chapter 11 to make a claim under articles 1110 or 1105. As
quoted by Shrybman, the U.S. interpretation of the social services Annex II reservation
was once expressed in the following way:
The reservation in Annex II (II-U-5) is intended to cover services which are
similar to those provided by a government, such as child care or drug treat-
ment programs. If those services are supplied by a private firm, on a profit or
not-for-profit basis, Chapter Eleven and Chapter Twelve apply. If a private
firm provides those services on contract to the government, then it is consid-
ered government procurement. 45
If an arbitral tribunal accepts the argument that chapter 11 applies when health ser-
vices are supplied by a private firm (whether for profit or not), the investor would be able
to make a chapter 11 claim. In other words, the Annex II reservation would be of no
effect because the relevant social service is not established or maintained for a public pur-
pose. Absent a Commission interpretation to the contrary,46 arbitral tribunals could go
either way47 on whether or not the presence of a private firm removes protection of the
public purpose reservation.
According to Shrybman, the phrase "public purpose" is difficult to define:
The term 'public purpose' isn't defined in the Oxford Dictionary [,] but it -
does appear in Article 1110 with reference to expropriation. In this context
42. Shrybman, supra note 41, at 42.
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45. Shrybman, supra note 41, at 27 (quoting correspondence from Michael Kantor, United States
Trade Representative (USTR), to the Attorney General for the State of Oregon (Mar. 1996).
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
216 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
the term may be considered as having broad application. For example an
American text on the subject of expropriation under international law, com-
ments that the 'concept of public purpose is broad and not subject to effective
reexamination by other states' [Restatement of the Law: Foreign Relations
Law in the United States] [emphasis in original] But caution is needed to not
take this view out of context. The interpretation of 'public purpose' might
understandably be more liberal in the context of expropriations law because
of the requirement that compensation be paid even where the taking is for [a]
public purpose. A trade panel or tribunal might be more circumspect where
the result would be to deny rights altogether.4 8
Given the ambiguity of the phrase "public purpose," and its occurrence in article
1110 (imposing obligations on the NAFTA party), and the social services sector reserva-
tions of Annex II (providing NAFTA parties limited relief from various chapter 11 and 12
obligations), it is difficult to predict how the phrase might be interpreted. A Commission
interpretation could settle the issue, but would be largely driven by the domestic politics
of each party. Presumably, Canada would have to put something on the table in another
area in order to obtain an interpretation that would help protect its social services sector.
Shrybman's cry of alarm is summed up in his assessment of the central government's
eventual response to Bill 11:
If the federal government concludes that Alberta's plans are consistent with
the requirements of the Canada Health Act, a number of consequences are
foreseeable. On a practical level, we understand that at least some other
provinces will be tempted to follow Alberta's lead. If they decide to follow
Alberta's lead, the proliferation of private sector health care delivery of surgi-
cal services would obviously extend beyond Alberta. As noted, with greater
participation by private providers the task of defending Canada's system as
one falling within Annex II parameters becomes more difficult. Thus support
for, or even acquiescence, to Alberta's reforms is likely to place Canada's health
care system on a slippery slope that is likely to accelerate private sector partic-
ipation in the delivery of virtually all insured health services. 49
If my analysis concerning the current rights of NAFTA investors in for-profit health-
care enterprises is correct, Canada embarked on Shrybman's "slippery slope" with the
NAFTA bargain. The Alberta legislation does little to change the current situation.
2. David Schneiderman.
David Schneiderman argues that U.S. constitutional law on takings was exported to
the other NAFTA parties through NAFTA generally and article 1110 in particular. 50 He
48. Shrybman, supra note 41, at 24-25.
49. Shrybman, supra note 41, at 39.
50. David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46
U. TORONTO L.J. 499, 512 (1996).
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refers to the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment 51 (law of takings) and Fourteenth
Amendment 52 (law of due process). In doing so, he helps to elucidate the meaning of
"public purpose" (at least in U.S. law):
The Fifth Amendment, for example, prohibited takings of private property
unless they were taken for a public purpose and with just compensation.
Although courts after 1937 would relax the requirement that takings be for
public use, [Thomas] Cooley operated within a classical legal paradigm which
distinguished sharply between public purpose and private interest. The pur-
pose, wrote Cooley, 'must be public, and must have reference to the needs of
government. No reason of general public policy will be sufficient to protect
such transfers where they operate on vested rights.' Constitutional Limitations,
6th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1890), at p. 357 (other notes omitted). 53.
It may be true, as Schneiderman argues, that article 1110 simply incorporates con-
cepts from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments relating to prohibitions on the taking
of property unless for a public use, following due process, and with just compensation.
On the other hand, traditional international law and U.S. takings law may be similar.54 It
remains to be seen to what extent the domestic law of the NAFTA parties (as opposed to
international law) will be applied by chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. 55 Schneiderman's gen-
eral conclusion is to the effect that the free reign of Canadian legislators has been serious-
ly and surreptitiously hampered by NAFTA:
51. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. Amend V.
52. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. Amend XIV, § 1.
53. Schneiderman, supra note 50, at 506-07.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 29.
55. David A. Gantz, infra note 123, notes: "There is no reference in NAFTA to use of national law
as a basis for interpreting the provisions of Chapter 11" Environmental 'Takings' Under
Chapter 11 - Does NAFTA Require Compensation for Environmental Regulations?; see also supra
note 29. According to Ian Brownlie, infra note 122, at 536, "Constitutional provisions, legisla-
tion providing for compensation, and municipal court decisions provide a general guide but
no more than that, since local versions of public policy are not necessarily significant for inter-
national law.' (notes omitted).
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The aim of this article has been to demonstrate that NAFTA incorporates into
Canadian law standards and principles drawn from American constitutional
law. To the extent that NAFTA accomplishes this task, and I believe the parlia-
mentary hearings on plain packaging give witness to this transformation,
Canadian constitutionalism will have been significantly altered. [Note: While
I have emphasized in this article only NAFTA's expropriation provisions, a
similar analysis could have been undertaken of other provisions in NAFTA.
Much of the NAFTA text will have the effect of disabling Canadian legisla-
tures from launching new regulatory initiatives which impact on transnation-
al business interests.] The constitutional design of energetic federalism with
regard to economic matters will effectively have been transformed. Canadians
no longer will be discussing which level of government can initiate which eco-
nomic regulation (a popular Canadian constitutional pastime). In many
instances, Canadians will now be discussing whether either level of govern-
ment can initiate such legislation at all. While Canadians began this transfor-
mation with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, it is significant that they did not choose directly to entrench property
rights. It is, to say the least, disquieting that this task effectively has been
accomplished via NAFTA, without any accompanying national debate direct-
ed at such a proposal (other notes omitted). 56
3. Donald Macdonald.
On this ominous note, I propose to continue this survey with the unique perspective
of the Honourable Donald Macdonald. 57 A former cabinet minister in the central gov-
ernment, Macdonald also chaired the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada (1985) that recommended free trade with the United
States. Macdonald explains Canada's historic reluctance to enter into an international
treaty guaranteeing property rights58 and allowing for private standing.59 He speculates
56. Schneiderman, supra note 50, at 535-36.
57. Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implications for Sovereignty?, 24
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281 (1998).
58. Provincial governments have constitutional power over "property and civil rights in the
province" under § 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. The central
government has the power to enter into treaties with foreign states, but must rely on the
provinces to enact the provisions over which they have authority. Id. at 282-84.
59. Macdonald offers a possible explanation of how the traditional international law distaste for
private standing was overcome in the case of NAFTA:
Speaking from my own experience, both within and outside government, officials
responsible for claims against governments have found themselves caught in a
dilemma. First, as Canadian nationals go increasingly out into the world, they are
going to get into disputes with foreign governments. The Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade would prefer not to have to bear the increased
burden of espousing cases on behalf of nationals. As every legal practitioner
knows, not every claimant is noble, and not every claim is meritorious, and the
process of determining which are and which are not can be expensive, both in
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that during the negotiations leading up to the signing of NAFTA, the central government
was emboldened by its trade regulation power 60 to enter into a treaty concerning trade.
He suggests that a (hypothetically successful) constitutional challenge to NAFTA chapter
11 might leave the central government liable for paying compensation to a chapter 11
claimant even if the impugned expropriatory action were that of a province. Referring to
the Ethyl-MMT affair (which had not yet been settled), Macdonald noted the difficulty
for the arbitrators of deciding whether regulation constituted expropriation:
"Conceivably, the arbitrators in the Ethyl case will have to wrestle with the differences in
the laws of Canada and the United States on whether a regulatory scheme created by the
legislature that adversely affects the property rights of a claimant would constitute 'expro-
priation' under Article 1110 of NAFTA.' '6 1
We now know that those arbitrators did not have to wrestle with the merits of Ethyl
Corporation's claim. In Azinian, the only chapter 11 claim decided to date, the arbitral
tribunal decided that a breach of contract by a municipal corporation did not constitute
an expropriatory action under article 1110. Thus, the effect of a regulatory "taking" has
yet to be tested. Macdonald seems to assume that a regulation for public health could save
a measure from being considered expropriatory: 62
Whatever the merits of the technical arguments, I would anticipate that one of
the arguments of the government of Canada would be that the effect of the
statute was not 'expropriation: but rather 'regulation' for the protection of pub-
lic health and, therefore, would be beyond the jurisdiction of Chapter 11.63
Perhaps partly because of his perception that an expropriatory measure could be
saved if it were for the protection of public health, Macdonald is, on the whole, rather
sanguine about the implications for sovereignty of chapter 11 in general and article 1110
in particular. He only adverts to a potential constraint on sovereignty in the following
passage:
If measures in Canada to give pre-eminence to public institutions as providers
of health care, or to guarantee the continuation of media of communication
that assure Canadian content, were to be classified as 'expropriation' of for-
eign interests with consequent costs in damages, then national policies with
widespread public support would be in jeopardy.6 4
In an understatement that may prove prophetic, Macdonald adds: "The decision in
the Ethyl case may have ramifications wider than the fuel additive business."
65
time and substance. And, secondly, some claims have a capacity to become
national or even international incidents, and governments cannot afford to be
seen to be indifferent to the interests of the national or nationals in question.
Id. at 288.
60. "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.' - § 91(2), Constitution Act, 1867.
61. Macdonald, supra note 57, at 287.
62. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
63. Macdonald, supra note 57, at 287.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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4. Julie Soloway
In her article, Julie Soloway points out two areas of chapter 11 that, in her mind, are
problematic. 66 The first is the non-transparency of the arbitration process, 67 which she
sees as a "denial of a fundamental democratic norm."68 The second is the difficulty of
defining the phrase "a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation. '69 In her
view, expropriation is a well-defined concept, as is regulation, which does not constitute a
taking. Somewhere on the spectrum between the two, however, one encounters a measure
tantamount to expropriation in the form of a regulation-a regulatory taking. The prob-
lem is finding an international norm that distinguishes between an acceptable regulation
and a regulatory taking. Soloway cites Rudolph Dolzer who has described the law of indi-
rect expropriation as "'sketchy and rough"' and as an area where "'large lacunae
remain."' 70 Her fear is that given these lacunae, arbitration tribunals might have recourse
to the U.S. law of regulatory takings. She refers to an article by Edward M. Graham
wherein he describes the evolution of the U.S. approach:
[Graham] defines the surviving guiding principle here as the 'diminution of
value' rule, that is 'there can be cases where an action 'goes too far' in terms of
reducing the value of the asset or property and where compensation is
required.' At the same time Graham observes that there exists no real defini-
tion of what 'too far' actually entails and that judicial interpretation has in fact
been inconsistent (notes omitted).7 1
In contrast, the Canadian approach is best illustrated, according to Soloway, by a
recent judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The headnote sets out the issue:
The respondents in two appeals, the A&L action and the H Inc. action, were
individuals and corporations who owned rental residential properties in
Ontario that were subject to rent control under the Residential Rent
Regulation Act, 1986 (the '1986 Act'). They sued for a declaration that they
were entitled to compensation from the provincial government ('the Crown')
for their losses resulting from the alleged expropriation, taking, destruction or
extinguishment of their property and property rights by reason of the passage
and effect of the Residential Rent Regulation Amendment Act, 1991 (the
'1991 Act'). The effect of the 1991 Act was to void retroactively existing orders
approving future rent increases and orders authorizing notices of phase-in of
future rent increases where those increases were to be effective on or after
October 1, 1990. The respondents in the A&L action also claimed that their
66. Julie A. Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11 - The Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J. INT'L
ARB. 1, 10 (1999).
67. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68. Soloway, supra note 66, at 11.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8 (citing Ruldof Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LJ. 41 (1986)).
71. Id. at 9-10 (citing Edward M. Graham, Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment and the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Issues Raised by Non-governmental Organizations, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 599, 605 (1998)).
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rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated
by the enactment of the 1991 Act.72
In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal found that the 1991 Act was an exer-
cise of regulatory authority and that it did not constitute an act of expropriation. 73
In summary, the U.S. approach is much more sensitive to regulatory action that neg-
atively affects property value than is the Canadian approach (where property rights are
not constitutionally guaranteed). Should NAFTA chapter 11 arbitral tribunals favor the
U.S. approach (as suggested will happen by Schneiderman), 74 the effect seen by Soloway
is that," ... a tribunal of non-elected, non-Canadian persons would be in the position of
reviewing the Canadian legislature's choice of policy instrument."75
5. Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke.
In their article, Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke from the International
Institute for Sustainable Development consider chapter 11 with respect to the environ-
ment. 76 On article 1110 in particular, they note that there are three different expropriato-
ry thresholds:
direct nationalization or expropriation;
indirect nationalization or expropriation;
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation. 77
They note that direct nationalization does not pose any definitional difficulties. The
problem arises with the less direct means of expropriation. International law recognizes
the validity of "police powers" as long as they are non-discriminatory. 78 Somewhere
between police powers (which do not constitute expropriatory measures) and direct
72. A&L Investments Ltd. v. Ontario, [1997] 36 O.R. 3d 127.
73. Soloway, supra note 66, at 9 (citing A&L Investments Ltd. v. Ontario):
The 1991 Act is not an act of expropriation by the Crown. Rather it is an exercise
of its regulatory authority. There is no principle of statutory interpretation that
would presume that those adversely affected by a statute regulating their affairs
are entitled to compensation unless the statute says otherwise. No policy basis is
readily apparent for such a rule. Indeed, such a principle would severely hamper
the operation of the modern state where most regulatory legislation, however
remedial, adversely affects someone. Moreover, if regulatory legislation voiding
but not expropriating property rights triggered a presumed right to compensa-
tion from the State, the effect would be to give property rights the equivalent of
the protection accorded by section 7 of the Charter despite the clear exclusion of
such rights from the [Canadian] Charter of Rights and Freedoms by its drafters.
In other words, an individual would have the right not to be deprived of his prop-
erty by regulatory legislation except with compensation or with an explicit over-
ride of that right by legislative language. This would seem to do indirectly some-
thing the framers of the Charter declined to do.
74. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75. Soloway, supra note 66, at 10.
76. Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment - Addressing
the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, International Institute for
Sustainable Development (1999), at http://iisd.ca/pdf/nafta.pdf.
77. See id.
78. See Mann & von Moltke, supra note 76, at 40 (referring to Dolzer, supra note 70, at 62).
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expropriation, there are indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropria-
tion. The following criteria were suggested by George Aldrich based on his experience
with the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal:
1. The Tribunal has been concerned to ensure that property rights are
respected and that compensation is paid when the alien owner of those
rights is deprived of them by acts attributable to a state.
2. Liability exists whenever acts attributable to a state have deprived an alien
owner of property rights of value to him, regardless of whether the state
has thereby obtained anything of value to it.
3. Liability is not affected by the intent or absence of intent attributable to the
state.
4. Liability does not require the transfer of title to the property.
5. Liability does not arise from actions that are non-discriminatory and are
within the commonly accepted taxation and police powers of states.
6. Liability is not affected by the fact that the state has acted for legitimate
economic or social reasons and in accordance with its laws.
79
These criteria underline two important aspects: the exercise of police powers is non-
compensable (criterion 5), and intent and purpose on the part of the expropriating state
are irrelevant (criteria 3 and 6). This immediately causes potential confusion: on one
hand, article 1110 makes no explicit exception for police powers; on the other, it does not
exempt "public purpose" expropriatory measures from the requirement of compensation.
How then is one to differentiate between the non-compensable exercise of police powers
(under international law) and an article 1110 compensable regulatory taking (even for a
public purpose and without expropriatory intent)?80
Mann and von Moltke suggest that since intent and purpose are irrelevant in decid-
ing whether a measure is expropriatory, one must look at the de facto impact of a mea-
sure: "If the effect is to significantly interfere with the operation of an investment, it can
then be found to be an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to expropria-
tion."8 1 However, they are of the opinion that application of the "effects test" is of little
assistance in determining whether a measure is justified under the police powers excep-
tion.82 NAFTA does provide for specific exceptions to expropriatory measures: licensing
of intellectual property rights under article 1110(7)83 and measures of general applica-
tion that cause a debtor to default on a debt under article 1110(8). As noted above, 8 4
NAFTA also provides a special procedure for excepting taxation measures from the ambit
of article 1110. Since NAFTA provides a general rule concerning expropriatory measures
as well as specific exceptions to that rule, the question arises as to whether the list of
79. Mann & von Moltke, supra note 76, at 40-41 (citing George Aldrich, What Constitutes a
Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 609 (1994).
80. See Mann & von Moltke, supra note 76, at 41.
81. ld. at 42.
82. "These factors all contribute to a state of uncertainty under general international law over the
current scope of the police powers carve-out from the notion of expropriation." Id. at 44.
83. See supra note 37.
84. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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exceptions is exhaustive or illustrative. In other words, if certain specified measures are
excepted from the application of article 1110, what of measures that are not excepted, for
example, environmental measures? "Each of these provisions in NAFTA has the potential
to strengthen legal arguments that environmental measures taken for a public purpose
can form a basis of a claim for compensation."
8 5
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties8 6 provides that where a treaty provision
is ambiguous, recourse may be had to the negotiating history.8 7 Unfortunately, in the case
of NAFTA, the negotiating history is unavailable.88 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides that recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpre-
tation to determine the meaning when interpretation otherwise leads to a result that is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Mann and von Moltke point out the following absurd
85. Mann & von Moltke, supra note 76, at 45.
86. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980). Canada ratified the Treaty on October 14, 1970; Mexico did so on September
25, 1974.
87. Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instru-
ment related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Id. art. 31.
Article 32. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to deter-
mine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable'
Id. art. 32.
88. "Unfortunately, there is no specific drafting record publicly available to elaborate on what the
precise scope, or limitations on the scope of Article 1110 was intended to be, and hence little to
provide to arbitral panels to support narrower views of the intended scope." [Note: Indeed,
according to some government officials, there is no collated drafting record in relation to
Chapter 11 at all.] Mann & von Moltke, supra note 76, at 45.
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results. First, because of the long-term nature of many investments, intervening regulation
could be perceived by the investor as a measure tantamount to expropriation. This interpre-
tation would have the effect of freezing the regulation power of a host government for the
life of an investment (effectively a "stabilization clause"). 89 Second, accepting that any regu-
lation constitutes a measure tantamount to expropriation and calls for compensation could
turn the "polluter pays" principle on its head in the environmental context. Given these
absurd and unreasonable results, Mann and von Moltke believe that the weight of interna-
tional law and the appropriate policy to be applied to the interpretation process support the
exclusion of bona fide and non-discriminatory public welfare regulatory measures from the
reach of article 1110.90 It will be interesting to see what supplementary means of interpreta-
tion are discovered to support this position in the years to come. Although Mann and von
Moltke may be completely right in the environmental context, a special one for NAFTA,9 1
there are other social policy areas where regulation is also required. As previously noted,
however,92 the general exceptions set out in article 2101 covering most of the social policy
areas 93 do not apply to chapter 11.
B. AUTHORS WHO FEEL THAT INVESTOR-STATE CLAIMS SHOULD NOT CAUSE ALARM.
1. Daniel M. Price.
Daniel Price was a negotiator of the investment chapter on behalf of the U.S. Trade
Representative. In introducing chapter 11, he recalls the intimate relationship between trade
and investment: "Trade and investment flows are interdependent. To achieve the benefits of
economic liberalization, investment barriers must be addressed as comprehensively as trade
barriers: '94 In the conclusion to his overview of chapter 11, he notes its originality:
Chapter 11 is the most comprehensive investment accord to date. The breadth
of coverage and the strength of the disciplines exceed those found in any
bilateral or multilateral instrument to which the United States is a party. The
chapter unites two countries - Mexico and the United States - that have for
decades sat on opposite sides of an ideological divide on such fundamental
issues as expropriation, dispute settlement, and government control over for-
eign investment. Just as importantly, the chapter represents the first occasion
when two developed OECD countries have made the same commitments to
each other that they have demanded of developing countries. The chapter
ought to set a standard for further multilateral and bilateral investment
accords in the hemisphere.
95
89. Id. at 46.
90. See id. at 47.
91. See id. at 3; see also the Preamble to NAFTA, which mentions "environmental protection and
conservation," "sustainable development" and "the development and enforcement of environ-
mental laws and regulations"; see also supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
93. Namely, public morals, human, animal or plant life or health, and prison labor. See GATT,
supra note 8, art. XX(a), (b), (e).
94. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727 (1993).
95. Id. at 736.
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Although his overview was published in the afterglow of achievement and before
NAFTA entered into force, it is useful to recall the fact that chapter 11 was an essential
part of the NAFTA bargain. 96
2. J. Anthony VanDuzer.
Anthony VanDuzer notes that NAFTA chapter 11 obligations "go far beyond tradi-
tional investor protection against expropriation and restrictions on the repatriation of
funds."' 97 In the context of judicial review of arbitral tribunal awards, he considers the
conflict between public policy regulation and investor protection:
It will be interesting to see how the traditional reluctance of the courts to
intervene on the basis of public policy will operate in Chapter I 1 cases where
the government measure complained about is designed to promote some
important, generally recognized public policy. In the MMT case, for example,
the measure complained about - a ban on the import and interprovincial
transport of the gasoline additive MMT - has the ostensible purpose of pro-
96. As noted by Price, NAFTA goes beyond traditional investment protection. For comparison
purposes, article I(e)(ii) of the 1979 Canada-Yugoslavia Agreement on the Protection of
Investments provided:
'Non commercial risk' means damage to insured investments that has resulted in
payment of an investment insurance claim for losses by reason of: [... ]
Nationalization, expropriation or other measures by the Federal Executive
Council or other state organ in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that
may amount to nationalization or expropriation.
Canada-Yugoslavia Agreement on the Protection of Investments (no longer in force) (1979), at
http://www.dfait-maeci.ca/tna-nac/fipa-e.asp. Article VIII of the 1997 Investment Protection
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Armenia
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments provides:
1. Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having an effect equiv-
alent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 'expro-
priation') in the territory of the other Contracting Party, except for a public
purpose, under due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and
against prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such compensation
shall be based on the genuine value of the investment or returns expropriat-
ed immediately before the expropriation or at the time the proposed expro-
priation became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier, shall be payable
from the date of expropriation at a normal commercial rate of interest,
shall be paid without delay and shall be effectively realizable and freely
transferable.
2. The investor affected shall have a right, under the law of the Contracting
Party making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a judicial or other
independent authority of that Party, of its case and of the valuation of its
investment or returns in accordance with the principles set out in this
Article.
Investment Protection Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (1997).
97. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA - Chapter 11: The Shape
of Things to Come?, 1997 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 272.
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tecting the Canadian environment. The investor, Ethyl Corporation, is assert-
ing that its commercial interests have been expropriated by the federal gov-
ernment ban. If the environmental risk associated with the use of MMT was
significant enough and the measure justifiable as a means of reducing the risk,
would a court refuse to enforce an award on the basis of public policy? Each
NAFTA Party's right to enact measures to protect the environment is express-
ly recognized in Chapter 11. Nevertheless, a decision to refuse to enforce an
award in these circumstances would severely undermine the Chapter 11
process. It would also be hard to justify because an award under Chapter 11
does not prevent the government from continuing the measure. It only
requires the government to pay compensation to the injured investor.
Nevertheless, the price associated with such a compensation award may be
sufficiently high that the consequence of enforcing the award might be the
repeal of the measure. In the MMT case, the compensation sought was US
$251 million (notes omitted).98
VanDuzer returns to this dynamic in his conclusion:
The manner in which these issues and others are resolved will have significant
implications, not just for the effectiveness of the Chapter 11 process, but also for
the balance struck by Chapter 11 between the rights of investors and the free-
dom of states to make rules governing activities within their own borders.99
It is clear that VanDuzer feels that chapter 11 represents a bargain that should not be
upset by aggressive interpretation in either direction. He is obviously equally concerned
with the effectiveness of chapter 11 and the regulation-making power of a sovereign gov-
ernment. His solution would seem to be the sovereignty-maintaining mechanism of
expropriatory measures accompanied by compensation.
3. Gary N. Horlick and Alicia L. Marti.
Gary Horlick and Alicia Marti think that NAFTA chapter lI B is an "interesting
adventure"'100 in investment arbitration. While recognizing the broad scope of NAFTAs
investment provisions, they do not appear overly concerned about its potential to restrict
the exercise of a NAFTA party's sovereignty. Viewing chapter 11 from the perspective of
the investor, they observe that it contains a series of limitations, reservations, and excep-
tions.101 In particular, they quote (without comment) the police powers exception set out
in article 1101(4).102 They also feel that arbitrators may be hesitant to "open the flood
gates" of chapter 11 to claims that involve trade disputes. 103 They conclude their assess-
ment of chapter 11 by noting that, at the very least, access to binding arbitration is a valu-
able tool to an investor, albeit one they think investors would use sparingly. "It remains to
98. Id. at 287.
99. Id. at 289-90.
100. Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA Chapter IB - A Private Right of Action to Enforce
Market Access through Investments, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 44 (1997).
101. See id. at n.31-59 and accompanying text.
102. See id. at 47-48; see also supra note 38, at 70.
103. Horlick & Marti, supra note 100, at 53.
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be seen whether investors will push the Chapter 11 B dispute resolution mechanism to its
limits - as yet it is an untapped source of private investor rights, including guaranteed
access to a NAFTA panel for a private party."'104
Their evaluation of how far arbitrators will allow the dispute settlement mechanism
of chapter 11 to reach remains to be verified in practice. With respect to their invocation
of the police powers limit, however, I would note that the limit is self-limiting. NAFTA
parties may exercise police powers "in a manner that is not inconsistent with this
Chapter."' 0 5 Similar wording is found with respect to the power of parties to adopt,
maintain, or enforce environmental measures "otherwise consistent with this Chapter"' 06
and the general exception allowing parties to secure compliance with laws or regulations
"that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 107 Since the exercise of
these powers must be consistent with NAFTA, one wonders whether the purported power
has any real content.
4. Kevin Banks.
In a recent contribution to the interpretation of article 1110, Kevin Banks suggests:
(1) the bona fides of a government regulation may be determinative as to whether or not
it is compensable; and (2) the U.S. case law on regulatory takings should not be imported
directly into chapter 11.108
With respect to determining when regulations are compensable under article 1110,
Banks considers and rejects the balancing approach:
Some might argue that a measure of deference to domestic legislatures could
be secured by using a balancing test that would, for example, weigh the rea-
sonableness of the regulatory objective, the proportionality of the regulatory
means used to achieve that objective, and the extent of interference with
property rights. This is in effect what the European Court of Justice did once
it read protection of property rights into European Community law.
There is, however, a set of related legal and political problems with applying a
balancing test under NAFTA's chapter 11. There is no express authorization
for this type of test in the text of the agreement. Moreover, outside of Europe,
international law has not adopted the use of a balancing approach, but has
instead generally sought to distinguish categorically between 'takings" 'expro-
priations: and the like on the one hand, and non-compensable measures on
the other (notes omitted). 109
Banks notes that rejecting the balancing approach in the area of property rights pro-
tection leaves only the categorical approach (the two main categories of measures being
104. Id. at 54.
105. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1101(4).
106. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1114(1).
107. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2101(2). As noted above (supra note 9 and accompanying text), arti-
cle 2101 does not apply to chapter 11.
108. See Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110 - Can Regulation be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 499 (1999).
109. Id. at 506.
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expropriatory and non-compensable). A line must still be drawn between the two cate-
gories: "At the end of the day, it appears that either some or all regulatory measures will
be categorically distinguished from measures giving rise to compensation obligations
under chapter 11 or many such measures will run the risk of generating compensation
claims." 110 Banks recalls that international law has recognized the police powers excep-
tion to expropriatory measures: "... a state is not liable for economic injury that is a con-
sequence of bona fide regulation within the accepted police power of the state." I 1
However, a (non-compensable) bona fide police power regulation must still be distin-
guished from a (compensable) public purpose expropriatory measure under article 1110.
NAFTA parties may receive support from the existence of the environment and labor
side accords. As "agreement[s] relating to the treaty which was made between all the par-
ties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty," 112 they form part of the context of
article 1110 for the purposes of treaty interpretation. The side accords clearly show the
importance the NAFTA parties attach to environmental and labor issues. They do not,
however, exhaust the list of recognized public policy issues.
Banks draws some interesting lessons from the language of article 1110. He thinks
that, but for article 1110(7), various regulatory actions in the intellectual property area
might have been considered expropriatory. Article 1110(8) applies to debt securities and
loans. 113 It refers explicitly only to measures tantamount to expropriation (and not to
direct or indirect expropriations). It also covers any non-discriminatory measure of gen-
eral application, however, which might have been thought to be already part of the police
powers exception. Finally, it curiously includes the phrase "For purposes of this Article
and for greater certainty .... -114 It should be noted that article 1110(8) allows a party,
using the lowest threshold of expropriatory measure, to impose costs that ultimately
result in default on a debt, thereby potentially wiping out the investment.
After having carefully analyzed the terms of article 1110, Banks concludes that the
distinction between compensable and non-compensable measures under chapter 11 is
still vague:
On the side of compensable measures, we lack a specific description of the
legal transaction of expropriation, and of the kind of functional or effective
equivalency between an expropriation and a measure tantamount to one. If a
measure is not tantamount to expropriation because it causes the destruction
of the value of an investment, what in the alternative or in addition is
required? Similar questions arise on the side of non-compensable measures. If
some regulatory measures are non-compensable, how are they distinguished
from those of taxation, licensing, or other measures that are, under certain
circumstances at least, potentially compensable measures? Would a test of the
bona fides of the measure suffice for this purpose? 15
110. Id. at 509.
111. Id.
112. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86, art. 31(a).
113. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110(8). These are just two of the many investments defined by arti-
cle 1139.
114. Id.
115. Banks, supra note 108, at 513-14.
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Banks then considers the case law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. He
notes that the Tribunal's mandate was to resolve disputes arising out of "expropriations
and other measures affecting property rights."116 That body of case law must therefore be
applied with caution to article 1110 of NAFTA, which probably does not cover "other
measures affecting property rights." 17 Banks concludes his review of the Tribunal's work
by noting:
The tests articulated by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunals to separate com-
pensable and non-compensable measures tended, as did those of earlier
Tribunals, to be broadly and vaguely worded. [...] Tribunals have on the whole
not applied the broader category of compensable takings to bona fide regula-
tions of property use, even where such regulation results in the loss to the owner
of most, if not all, viable economic uses of the property. Compensable 'taking'
findings have generally been limited to cases in which the government actually
took possession or control of an enterprise or other substantial property interest,
formally voided a set of property rights that an investor had relied upon in mak-
ing further investments, or without a bona fide regulatory purpose so restricted
the use of the property as to deprive the owner of any benefit of it. 118
As Banks candidly recognizes, a key question remains:" ... whether an investor who is
deprived of the rights to use an investment to the extent that it is no longer economically
viable may be denied compensation on the basis that this was the result of a bonafide regu-
latory measure." 119 Although, according to Banks, the U.S. law of regulatory takings gener-
ally considers the economic effects of regulations in determining whether or not they are
compensable, he notes that imposing this case law on NAFTA parties via article 1110 was
probably not intended by the parties. 120 "It should not be assumed lightly that the NAFTA
parties intended to import U.S. takings jurisprudence, since within Canadian domestic poli-
tics a conscious decision was made not to do so."'121 Another more acceptable assumption is
that the NAFTA negotiators were well aware of international expropriation law and specifi-
cally intended to incorporate it into the Agreement. 122
116. Id. at 515 (quoting Claims Settlement Declaration, Jan. 20, 1981, U.S.-Iran, art. II, 20 I.L.M.
230, 231).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 519.
119. Id. at 520.
120. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86, art. 31(4).
121. Banks, supra note 108, at 521. As discussed above (supra note 54 and accompanying text), U.S.
and "traditional" international expropriation law may simply be similar. This could be a
reflection of the amount of U.S. foreign direct investment and the consequent numbers of
expropriation claims from U.S. investors.
122. For example, Ian Brownlie states the compensation rule as follows:
The rule supported by all leading 'Western' governments and many jurists in
Europe and North America is as follows: the expropriation of alien property is
lawful if prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is provided for. In princi-
ple, therefore, expropriation, as an exercise of territorial competence, is lawful, but
the compensation rule (in this version) makes the legality conditional.
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 5th ed. 1998). See also
Patrick Daillier et al., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1042-44 (Paris: L.G.D.J., 6th ed. 1999).
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5. Jason L. Gudofsky.
Jason Gudofsky presented a paper entitled "Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An
Environmental Case Study" at a conference held on March 6, 2000, in Toronto.1 23 His
treatment of police powers is extremely useful, but, first of all, here are his conclusions
with respect to the effect of article 1110 on the sovereignty of NAFTA parties:
Chapter 11 merely extends certain basic, fundamental rights to NAFTA
investors, such as non-discrimination, minimum standards of treatment and
transparency, and then empowers individual investors to enforce these obliga-
tions before a binding dispute settlement regime. Contrary to the views
expressed in the Sierra Opinion, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA will have no greater
impact on the 'capacity, explicitly or implicitly, of provincial, state and federal
governments to adopt necessary environmental and forest conservation mea-
sures than do everyday factors. From a legal perspective, provided that the
requirements in paragraphs (1)(a)-(d) of Article 1110 are met, Article 1110
(and confirmed by Article 1114) explicitly permits Parties to expropriate the
investments of NAFTA investors. However, practically, the NAFTA does not
alter the basic right of private citizens to sue their (host) government. If a
NAFTA investor merely intends to harass its host Party, it could do so just as
easily under domestic law. At best, the NAFTA provides NAFTA investors with
an alternative forum from which to pursue a claim. On that basis, Chapter 11
of the NAFTA is relatively neutral as to its impact on whether a Party will
implement necessary environmental and forest conservation measures.
To date, most of the criticisms of Article 1110, and of Chapter 11 more gener-
ally, have not been based on a well-considered and mature analysis of general
principles of international law. The Parties have agreed to ensure that NAFTA
investors in their territories will be accorded a certain minimum level of treat-
ment. To that end, the Sierra Opinion is correct to note that it is theoretically
possible that a NAFTA Party may be forced to provide certain treatment or a
certain standard of compensation to NAFTA investors than they may other-
wise have to provide their own citizens under domestic law. This is, however,
the precise purpose of Chapter 11, and, more generally, of international legal
agreements between nations, whether such agreements deal with, for example,
human rights, the environment or fiscal matters. Chapter 11 ensures that
NAFTA investors, at a minimum, are on a level playing field with domestic and
foreign investors in the territory of a Party. This includes a commitment that
NAFTA investors receive fair market value for their expropriated property.
However, before a NAFTA investor is entitled to receive compensation for an
interference with his or her investment, there first must be an expropriation.
123. Jason Gudofsky, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes: Litigating Against Sovereigns, ISBN
1-894015-30-4 (Mar. 6, 2000) (Conference organized by the National International Law
Section and National Continuing Legal Education Committee in conjunction with the
Canadian Bar Association-Ontario and the American Bar Association).
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The mere allegation of an expropriation is not sufficient. Similarly, the fact that
a measure has a detrimental impact on the investment is not necessarily suffi-
cient to make out an expropriation. Rather, the [e]ffect must exceed a certain
threshold level. The police powers defence further recognizes the inherent
right of a Party to regulate in support of the public interest and, provided that
it does not go too far or is not otherwise discriminatory, will absolve the Party
from paying compensation. The Sierra Opinion, unfortunately, either missed
or ignored this distinction (note omitted). 124
Aside from contradicting the opinion prepared by Jessica Clogg for the Sierra
Club, 125 Gudofsky thoroughly explains the police power exception to the international
law of expropriation. Once again, I will simply reproduce his succinct conclusion to this
part of his paper:
While the scope of the police power exception is not entirely certain, it
remains an important exception to the rule that aliens must be compensated
where their property is expropriated or nationalized. For NAFTA Parties, their
only excuse for not paying compensation to a NAFTA investor whose invest-
ment has been expropriated is if the expropriatory measure constitutes a
police power measure. Accordingly, the principle is of vital importance to
NAFTA Parties when they implement their environmental measures, such as
forest conservation and other environmental programs. Of course, the mea-
sure must amount to an expropriation in the first place, otherwise it does not
even give rise to a compensation requirement. A mere hindrance that has less
than a [non-] ephemeral impact on the use and enjoyment of property is not
sufficient to establish an expropriation claim. 126
Gudofsky is careful to qualify the police power exception as the "shadow land" of
expropriation law, due to its lack of clear content and hazy borders. 12 7 He also notes three
limits to the police power exception in international law: (1) outright or complete
destruction of property; (2) excessive measures; and (3) measures that apply in an arbi-
trary or discriminatory manner. 128
124. Jason Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental Case Study, at 71-72. (Conference
organized by the National International Law Section and National Continuing Legal Education
Committee in conjunction with the Canadian Bar Association-Ontario and the American Bar
Association).
125. Letter from Jessica Clogg, Attorney, to Bill Wareham, Executive Editor, Sierra Club of B.C.
(Sept. 2, 1999), at http://felix.vcn.bc.ca/wcel/forestry/0902weyernaftasub.html.
126. Gudofsky, supra note 124, at 54-55.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id. at 47-51.
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Il1. Application of Article 1110 in the Ethyl-MMT Affair.
In its Statement of Claim, Ethyl Corporation alleged the following artide 1110 breaches:
* interference with the claimant's operations;
* a substantial loss of sales revenues;
* harm to the claimant's goodwill and commercial reputation;
* unreasonable interference with the effective enjoyment of the investment's good-
will; and
* deprivation of the benefits of the investment.129
In reply, Canada argued:
* Article 1110 deals with the taking of property and not with regulation;
* regulation for the protection of health and the environment is permitted by
NAFTA;
* there has been no "taking" of any investment of the claimant; and
* the measure involves the exercise of police powers (maintenance of health, con-
servation of clean air, protection of the environment). 130
In attempting to assess the various arguments put forward by the disputing parties, I
make the following comments. With respect to Ethyl Corporation's claims, interference
simpliciter would be unlikely to found an article 1110 claim. In my opinion, it would not
even qualify as "tantamount to expropriation," the lowest threshold for an expropriatory
measure. Causing a substantial loss of sales revenues, on the other hand, is a measure
relating to an investment and could potentially qualify as a breach of article 1110.
Harming the claimant's goodwill in Canada could also be a measure relating to an invest-
ment. As to harm caused to the claimant's goodwill outside Canada, I do not think that it
is a measure relating to an investment in the territory of the Party, but I concede that this
point is debatable and could go to the quantum. Deprivation of the benefits of an invest-
ment could constitute a measure tantamount to expropriation.
With respect to Canada's reply, article 1110 covers expropriatory regulation. I do not
think that regulating to protect health or the environment necessarily insulates a measure
from an article 1110 claim. It is not necessary to transfer title to expropriate indirectly or
in a manner tantamount to expropriation. 13 1 Finally, regulating in the exercise of a police
power could justify a measure complained of under article 1110 depending on the facts
and the findings of the arbitral tribunal.
In the Ethyl-MMT affair, the article 1110 claim became moot once a domestic trade
body found that the interprovincial trade ban was an unjustified breach of the Agreement
on Internal Trade.132 Canada reached a settlement with Ethyl Corporation shortly after
the AIT decision was announced, thereby disposing of the chapter 11 claim.
129. See Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (MMT), NAFTA Chapter Eleven B, Statement
of Claim, paras. 21-27. This and other documents relating to the submissions of the parties are
available from the Trade Law Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada) KIA 0G2.
130. See id. at Statement of Defence, paras. 93-96.
131. See Canadian Memo, infra note 141, at 20.
132. See The Agreement on Internal Trade, Report of the Article 1701 Panel Concerning a Dispute
Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act (June 12,
1998), at http://www.intrasec.mb.ca/eng/0798/mmt.pdf.
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IV. Suggestions for Restoring Sovereignty.
I conclude from the viewpoints summarized above that, aside from the article 1110
carve-outs (IP, taxation, debt securities, and loans) 133 there are no clear criteria to define
a non-compensable expropriatory measure. 134 For the foreseeable future, therefore,
NAFTA parties are subject to the vagaries of interpretation by chapter 11 arbitral tri-
bunals. As I see it, the sovereignty restoring options (if required), are as detailed below.
A. REGULATION WITH COMPENSATION.
A NAFTA party may lawfully expropriate if the expropriatory measure meets all the
conditions of article 1110(1). The last condition, payment of compensation, may offend
the "polluter pay principle:' public opinion, or common sense, but a NAFTA party (like
any state) engages in a lawful exercise of state sovereignty if it compensates the claimant
investor. 135 In the Ethyl-MMT affair, Canada could have sustained its import and inter-
provincial trading ban on MMT if it had paid U.S.$251 million plus interests and
133. The carve-out language may even cloud the issue further:
Furthermore, the NAFTA use of'measures tantamount to expropriation' is explic-
itly qualified with respect to certain intellectual property matters subject to
NAFTA chapter 17 and with respect to debt securities. While this may lessen
some uncertainty about the scope NAFTA Parties accorded to an application of
,tantamount to expropriation, it may give rise to the argument that these words
are otherwise to be given a fill and unlimited interpretation.
Canadian Memo, infra note 141, at 20.
134. In Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID ARB(AF)/99/2 (Sept. 20, 1999), Mondev claims
that:
lain expropriation, or a measure tantamount to an expropriation, occurs when
government action interferes with an alien's use or enjoyment of property. As
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has held, '[a] deprivation or taking of property
may occur under international law through interference by a state in the use of
that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the
property is not affected.' The essence of an expropriation, according to Professor
Ian Brownlie, 'is the deprivation by state organs of a right of property either as
such, or by permanent transfer of the power of management and control.' (notes
omitted)
Id. at para. 123.
135. It should be noted that some expropriatory measures are illegal even though compensation is
paid:
... [T]here is evidence of a category of types of expropriation which are illegal
apart from a failure to provide for compensation, in which cases lack of compen-
sation is an additional element in, and not a condition of, the illegality. It has
been suggested that this category includes interference with the assets of interna-
tional organizations and taking contrary to promises amounting to estoppels.
Certainly it includes seizures which are a part of crimes against humanity or
genocide, involve breaches of international agreements, are measures of unlawful
retaliation or reprisal against another state, are discriminatory, being aimed at
persons of particular racial groups or nationals of particular states, or concern
property owned by a foreign state and dedicated to official state purposes.
Brownlie, supra note 122, at 541 (footnotes omitted).
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costs. 136 As Canadian government expenditures go, this is not enormous, especially if
human health and the environment are thereby protected.
B. RELIANCE ON ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS.
Arbitral tribunals may have no difficulty in distinguishing between compensable and
non-compensable regulations. In the only case decided to date, the arbitral tribunal
rejected the article 1110 claim. 137 Although tribunals are not subject to stare decisis,138 an
informal body of case law specific to NAFTA will no doubt emerge despite initial con-
cerns surrounding transparency.139
136. According to the Honourable Sergio Marchi, appearing as Minister of the Environment before
the Senate committee, U.S.$251 million would have been an excellent investment in health:
Finally, the dollar benefits must be factored into this economic equation. In this
regard, let us not forget the 1994 study commissioned by the same Canadian
Council of Environment Ministers which estimated that health benefits would be
up to $31 billion over a 23-year period if cleaner fuels and more stringent vehicle
emission standards were put in place in the Canadian marketplace. Put another
way, the cost to Canadians in extra health costs would be pared down by almost
$1.5 billion a year. That is above and beyond the incalculable value of avoiding
human suffering and pain related to air pollution. Adding it up in terms of the
economic impact, if this debate was simply an economic ledger sheet, taking
MMT out of gasoline is an economic plus, an economic bonus, and is a rationale
for this bill.
Senate committee, pp. 13:9-13:10.
137. See Azinian, supra note 35. In this claim, a U.S. investor claimed that a garbage collection con-
tract with a Mexican municipality was wrongly annulled. He sought a remedy in Mexican
courts and was unsuccessful at three different levels. He then claimed a violation of NAFTA
article 1110. The arbitral tribunal rejected his claim, stating in part:
83. To put it another way, a foreign investor entitled in principle to protection
under NAFTA may enter into contractual relations with a public authority, and
may suffer a breach by that authority, and still not be in a position to state a claim
under NAFTA. It is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be disappointed
in their dealings with public authorities, and disappointed yet again when nation-
al courts reject their complaints. It may safely be assumed that many Mexican
parties can be found who had business dealings with governmental entities which
were not to their satisfaction; Mexico is unlikely to be different from other coun-
tries in this respect. NAFTA was not intended to provide foreign investors with
blanket protection from this kind of disappointment, and nothing in its terms so
provides.
84. It therefore would not be sufficient for the Claimants to convince the present
Arbitral Tribunal that the actions or motivations of the Naucalpan Ayuntamiento
are to be disapproved, or that the reasons given by the Mexican courts in their
three judgements are unpersuasive. Such considerations are unavailing unless the
Claimants can point to a violation of an obligation established in Section A of
Chapter Eleven attributable to the Government of Mexico. (emphasis in original)
Id.
138. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 33.
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C. COMMISSION INTERPRETATION.
Several commentators have suggested that an interpretation by the Commission'
40
could allay some of the fears. It would appear from a memo dated November 13, 1998
from Mr. John Gero, Director General, Trade Policy Bureau II and NAFTA Coordinator to
Dr. Eduardo Solis Sanchez and Mr. Jon Juenemann, (Canadian Memo), that an interpre-
tation has been, or is being, considered.
14 1
For the reasons that follow, I think that consideration of an interpretation is prema-
ture. NAFTA explicitly provides that international law applies to the treatment accorded
140. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
141. The letter and two issue papers were published in Issues Paper on Expropriation, Inside U.S.
Trade No. 17, at 19-23 (1999) [hereinafter Canadian Memo]. The following issue paper was
appended to Mr. Gero's letter:
Issues Paper on Expropriation
A Possible Interpretation
Since the NAFTA Parties never intended the expropriation and compensation
provisions of NAFTA chapter Eleven to limit the legitimate rights of governments
to regulate, it would be useful to confirm the scope of the three elements that
constitute expropriation for the purposes of the NAFTA.
. In attempting to derive an appropriate interpretation, can we agree on some
assumptions based on international law, such as:
(i) that liability for expropriation does not required a transfer of title to the
State;
(ii) that liability may arise whenever acts attributable to a State deprive a foreign
investor of property rights of value, irrespective of whether the State has
obtained anything of value;
(iii) that liability may be found where a State subjects a foreign investor or invest-
ment to such unreasonable interference with the effective enjoyment of
property notwithstanding that the acts or measures in question are not
labelled expropriations or nationalizations;
(iv) that the intent to expropriate or the absence thereof on the part of the State
is not necessarily determinative of a finding of liability; and
(v) that customary law recognizes that acts or measures that may have an
impact on the value of property rights are not expropriatory where such acts
or measures are non-discriminatory and within the normal exercise of a
State's regulatory prerogative.
Notwithstanding broad consensus respecting the existence of a regulatory excep-
tion, customary law and the writings of leading commentators have yet to articu-
late clear rules to distinguish between a compensable taking and non-compens-
able regulation.
In this light, how can an interpretation confirm that the regulatory actions of
government are not covered to the extent that [...] such actions or measures are
reasonable on their face? Could we confirm that it would be up to the challenger
of an act or measure to demonstrate an absence of bona fides, or an abuse of gov-
ernmental powers or that the effect of the government actions or measures is
truly expropriative? Is it feasible to define a list of governmental activities as illus-
trations of legitimate government activities not requiring compensation? Are
there other means by which compensable takings and non-compensable regula-
tion may be distinguished?
Id. at 20.
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to investments of investors of another party 42 and that chapter 11 tribunals are to decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable rules of international
law. 143 More generally, the applicable rules of international law also apply to the interpre-
tation and application of NAFTA by the parties. 44 Before getting too excited about a
handful of investor-state claims under NAFTA chapter 11, only one of which has gotten
as far as an arbitral award (as of May 13, 2000), it would be useful to refer to some
"applicable" rules of international law.
In the fifth edition of Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie succinctly sets
out some of the relevant rules. He first distinguishes between expropriation, which can be
legal under international law if compensation is paid, and expropriation, which is illegal,
even though compensation may be paid. 145 He then states the compensation rule, which
applies to legal expropriations:" . . . the expropriation of alien property is lawful if prompt,
adequate and effective compensation is provided for."146 Finally, he cites exceptions to the
compensation rule. 147 Three of these exceptions are relevant to this discussion: the legiti-
mate exercise of police power (powers of government), taxation and other fiscal measures
(with no confiscatory intent), and health and planning legislation (causing indirect losses or
restrictions on the use of property). It should be noted that Brownlie qualifies such mea-
sures as prima facie lawful (i.e., there is a rebuttable presumption that they are not confisca-
tory). With respect to exceptions, the claimant would have the onus of demonstrating that a
measure belonging to a recognized exception is not lawful.
The Restatement adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute generally
accords with Brownlie's formulation. According to the Restatement, the following are not
142. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1105(1).
143. Id. art. 1131(1).
144. Id. art. 102(2).
145. See Brownlie, supra note 122.
146. Id.
147. Jurists supporting the compensation rule recognize the existence of exceptions,
the most widely accepted of which are as follows: under treaty provisions; as a
legitimate exercise of police power, including measures of defence against external
threats; confiscation as a penalty for crimes; seizure by way of taxation and other
fiscal measures; loss caused indirectly by health and planning legislation and the
concomitant restrictions on the use of property; the destruction of property of
neutrals as a consequence of military operations, and the taking of enemy proper-
ty as part payment of reparation for the consequences of an illegal war.
Id. at 538.
State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of government, may affect
foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation. Thus foreign
assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade restrictions involving
licences and quotas, or measures of devaluation. While special facts may alter
cases, in principle such measures are not unlawful and do not constitute expro-
priation. If the state gives a public enterprise special advantages, for example by
direction that it charge nominal rates of freight, the resulting de facto or quasi-
monopoly is not an expropriation if this were the primary or sole object of a
monopoly regime. Taxation which has the precise object and effect of confisca-
tion is probably unlawful. (notes omitted)
Id. at 535.
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confiscatory: measures that are rationally related to the state's security or economic poli-
cies; bona fide general taxation, regulation, and forfeiture for crime; measures based on
guidelines adopted by an international agency; and temporary deprivations of control
(e.g., freezing of assets). 148 The internal limitations of these exceptions should, however,
be noted: measures must be rationally related to a state's security or economic policies or
they risk being found discriminatory in intent or effect, general police power measures that
prevent, unreasonably interfere with, or unduly delay effective enjoyment of an alien's
property or its removal from the state's territory would probably be found to be takings;
and even temporary deprivations of control that cause significant injury could be found
to be takings. In sum, according to the Restatement, exceptions are not absolute. The facts
of individual claims would seem to be critical to the outcome.
Assuming that the above is at least representative of the "applicable rules" of interna-
tional law in the area of expropriations, 149 is an authoritative interpretation by the
NAFTA Commission essential now? Would an interpretation even be useful? As explained
above, investor rights under NAFTA are limited by reservations, exceptions, and carve-
outs in the Agreement itself. As just seen, they are further limited by an international law
police power exception. The police power exception provides a rebuttable defense to a
NAFTA party and is lost when exercised with malafides (for example, in a discriminatory
manner or causing significant harm). Distinguishing between compensable and non-
compensable takings in this "shadow land" is difficult, or even impossible, in the absence
of a specific fact situation. Yet, this is what a Commission interpretation would purport to
do in advance. By attempting to add specificity to the Agreement (the interpretation
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 29.
149. See Daillier et al., supra note 122. See also OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property (1967) and Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998), at
http://www.oecd.org/ech/index_2.htm. The World Trade Organization (WTO) also provides
indications of what state measures would be permitted to infringe on investments. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 3 (incorporating by reference "all excep-
tions under GATT 1994"). See also General Agreement on Trade in Services, article XIV, paras.(a)-(c):
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in ser-
vices, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order [note: The
public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.];
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the
effects of a default on services contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing
and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality
of individual records and accounts;
(iii) safety.
Id.
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would have no effect on the applicable rules of international law), an interpretation of the
Agreement could effectively result in an amendment, a change to the bargain.150 Investors
are not parties to the bargain, but the interests of the NAFTA parties are, in all likelihood,
quite divergent. Whether or not an effective amendment can be made without significant
negotiations is an open question. Unless serious issues are revealed by a consistent pattern
of arbitral awards causing significant concern to the NAFTA parties, I feel that an inter-
pretation is neither essential nor useful at this time.
D. RE-NEGOTIATION AND AMENDMENT.
NAFTA is open to modification and additions. 15 1 Re-opening it could have unex-
pected results, depending on the prevailing mood of the various stakeholders, not the
least of which is the U.S. Congress. In my opinion, a re-opening is highly unlikely. The
negotiations for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)1 52 could, however,
provide an opportunity for a "new and improved NAFTA:' an agreement that could be
added to the FTA and NAFTA, keeping what has been gained, and making improvements
in other areas. One of the improvements could be a new chapter 11 with clearer language
on non-compensable regulations.
E. WITHDRAWAL.
I see this as the least likely of scenarios given the degree of North American economic
integration attained in the first six years of NAFTA. It nevertheless remains a theoretical
option under article 2205.153 Canada was anxious for a rules-based relationship with the
United States and achieved it under the FTA. 154 Reluctant to allow the United States to cre-
150. Interpretations are provided for under articles 1131 and 1132. An amendment is provided for
under article 2202. Whereas amendments must be approved "in accordance with the applica-
ble legal procedures of each Party" interpretations issue from the Commission with no further
formalities. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2202.
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. See generally FTAA, Chronology of the FTAA Process, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/viewe.asp.
153. "A Party may withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of
withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws, the Agreement shall remain in force for
the remaining Parties." NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2205. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement would resume were Canada to withdraw from NAFTA. See JON R. JOHNSON, THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT - A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 16 (Aurora, Ontario:
Canada Law Book, 1994).
154. See generally Free Trade @ 10, The Political Battle Over the Ratification and Adoption of the
U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA, at http://www.freetradeatlO.com.
According to the Honourable John C. Crosbie:
It was clear to me and to our government that Canada had to have a fair, rules-
based, open international trading system because of our almost complete depen-
dence on international trade for our prosperity and because we lack the brute
political power of the U.S. or the European community which they can exercise
without a fair and rules-based open international trading system.
Id. at http://www.freetradeatlO.com/speeches/crosbie.html.
According to Derek Burney, "We knew that what was needed was a better, rules-based platform
for our most crucial trade relationship, one which would provide a greater degree of certainty
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ate a hub-and-spoke arrangement with its neighbors, Canada quickly joined with the
United States and Mexico in negotiating NAFTA. As just noted, Canada is currently
engaged in the FTAA negotiations as well as other existing and future bilateral trade agree-
ments (with Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica, for example). 155 None of these can replace, how-
ever, the trading and investment relationship Canada enjoys with the United States.156
V. Conclusion.
No one seems to be able to predict with confidence what article 1110 will allow in the
way of non-compensable expropriatory measures. This uncertainty can be uncomfortable
with respect to the exercise of sovereignty, depending on one's views. 157
for Canadian exporters with all the value-added benefit that would bring in terms of invest-
ment and productivity." Id. at http://www.freetradeat10.com/speeches/burney.html.
According to the Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, "I can say this as someone who has prac-
tised in the international trade law environment, Canada is advantaged when it can have these
disputes decided on the basis of law rather than of power." Id. at
http://www.freetradeat10.com/speeches/donald.html.
155. See Canada Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Regional and Bilateral Agreements, at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/reg-e.asp.
156. Canada and the United States are each other's largest trading partners, moving
about $1.5 billion worth of goods and services across the border each day. In
1999, Canada exported $310 billion in goods to the United States and imported
$249 billion in return. Services exports totalled $29.6 billion during the same
period, with corresponding imports at $34.3 billion. Canada's merchandise
exports to the United States alone support over 2 million Canadian jobs and gen-
erate 32.6 percent of Canada's GDP. Fully 85.9 percent of Canadian merchandise
exports are destined for the United States. Since the implementation of the FTA in
1989, two-way trade has more than doubled. Between 1992 and 1999, two-way
trade in goods increased by approximately 13 percent per year. This contrasts
with an average annual increase of approximately 6.4 percent over the same peri-
od for Canada's trade in goods with the rest of the world.
See Opening Doors to the World, supra note 3.
157. The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Canadian prime minister at the time the FTA and
NAFTA were brought in, expressed his thoughts on sovereignty at the "Free Trade at 10" gath-
ering in Montreal on June 4-5, 1999:
Canada's economy has undergone massive restructuring and modernizing over
the last dozen years. The results are evident and persuasive. We are growing into
a competitive nation whose lifeline is exports and international trade. This new
growth and wealth have enabled us to eliminate the deficits-both provincially
and federally and begin the process of paying down our debt, while cutting taxes
in some jurisdictions for our citizens. The controversial and painful measures
introduced to achieve this-principally the trilogy of free trade, GST and high
interest rates to eliminate inflation-have clearly made us stronger and enabled
Canada to dramatically improve the state of our public finances. This new eco-
nomic strength has in turn significantly enhanced Canadian sovereignty-
because such sovereignty is merely an illusion without the financial clout to back
it up and the economic opportunity it offers to growing numbers of our citizens.
Free Trade @ 10, supra note 154, at http://www.freetradeatiO.com/speeches/mulroney.html.
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Professor Donald M. McRae compared and contrasted two worldviews in his lectures
at the Academy of International Law. On the one hand, international law is extremely pre-
occupied with state sovereignty.' 58 On the other hand, the main thrust of international
trade law is to overcome the trade-diverting effects of borders: "States are better off if they
do not place barriers on the import of goods into their territories and enjoy the benefit of
others not imposing such restrictions." 159 McRae further writes:" . . . it is no longer pos-
sible to retreat behind borders and ignore the rest of the world as far as international
trade is concerned. In short, the incentives for States to act collectively on trade matters
are much stronger than they often are in other areas. ' 160 In another comment, McRae
notes," ... what is actually occurring in the field of international trade with the globaliza-
tion of capital and production casts serious doubts on the utility of a notion of sovereign-
ty and on the idea that a State exercises effective control over a national economy." 61
These comments invite reflection on the negative knee-jerk we admittedly experience
when an event such as the Ethyl-MMT affair occurs. Suddenly we realize that, because of
NAFTA, a foreign corporation could probably force a sovereign state to repeal a law that
might have a positive effect on the environment and human health. It is only in looking
beyond appearances that we are able to discern that the measure banning MMT was
untimely and perhaps unjustified. It interfered substantially and permanently with an
investor's investment. The scientific justification for the measure was speculative at best.
In reversing the ban, Canada showed its attachment to shared values of comparative
advantage and exchange 162 as opposed to an arbitrary exercise of sovereign will. Canada
was simply being consistent with a previous sovereign commitment.
158. A State, according to international law, is a territorially based political entity that
is independent from outside control and has full and complete authority over
persons and events within its territory. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice said in its advisory opinion in the Austro-German Customs Union case, a
State has 'the sole right of decision in all matters economic, political, financial or
other .. .' This is the notion of sovereignty. The legal attributes of sovereignty--of
statehood-involve territory, a population over which jurisdiction can be exer-
cised, and a Government that is in effective control of that territory. If these con-
ditions are present, a political entity will generally, but no invariably, be recog-
nized as a State with the capacity to enter into relations with other States-in
effect it will have attained membership in the international community.
Donald M. McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of
International Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS, 148-49 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).
159. Id. at 157.
160. Id. at 193.
161. Id. at 216.
162. The Preamble to NAFTA begins as follows:
The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and
the Government of the United States of America, resolved to:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among their
nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade
and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in
their territories;
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Canada is not only host to significant investments (approximately CDN$217 billion)
it is an even bigger investor abroad (approximately CDN$240 billion). 16 3 Just as
Canadians require predictability and stability for their investments abroad, so do foreign
investors desire the same for their investments in Canada. Although Canada has the free-
dom to legislate, it cannot do so without giving consideration in advance to its various
treaty obligations. The North American Free Trade Agreement is one of those treaties. It
introduces into Canadian law a duty to compensate investors in certain circumstances. If
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is provided (or if Canada can demonstrate
a police power exception), Canada's sovereignty is unaffected. But if Canada refuses com-
pensation and cannot prove an exception, trade rules.
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning and invest-
ment..." (emphasis added).
NAFTA, supra note 4, at Preamble.
163. See Opening Doors to the World, supra note 3.

